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Concepts like coercion, vulnerability, and dignitary harm have acquired specialized meanings in the research ethics
literature. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), also called Research Ethics Committees (RECs), sometimes use these
concepts in two different ways without acknowledging or even realizing what they are doing. IRBs mislabel any
language that encourages subject participation in trials as “coercive,” then demand its removal as if it were actually
coercive in the sense of a threat of force. An example of language that is treated as coercive is the use of the word
“hope” in an educational brochure about clinical trials. The concepts of vulnerability and dignitary harm are similarly
misused. The regulations instruct IRBs to protect vulnerable groups; but IRBs sometimes use a group’s vulnerability
to one threat to protect it against an unrelated and harmless threat, as when homeless people, who are vulnerable
to street crime and disease, are protected from the risk of an interview. Finally, the term “dignitary harm” is so
vague that IRBs can use it to restrict research that is entirely free of risk, while ignoring the possibility that research
might provide the dignitary benefit of contributing to society’s health and welfare. Dignitary harm—usually
nonphysical “harm” of which the subject is entirely unaware—can be deemed more important than obtaining
information that subjects want or actual risk of physical injury. These vague or shifting definitions permit the IRB to
play a shell game without either the board or the investigator realizing what is happening.
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Responsible regulation of research by Institutional Re-
view Boards (IRBs) or Research Ethics Committees (RECs)
requires a shared understanding, between regulator and
scientist, of what critical terms mean; it stumbles when
key concepts, like coercion, vulnerability, and dignitary
harm, have vague or shifting definitions. This is one piece
of the much larger problem of dysfunctional regulatory re-
view, documented in recent books [1,2] and hundreds
of articles.Coercion
One concept that IRBs routinely misuse is coercion; the
experience of Kenneth Getz is a recent case in point.
Getz, who directs the Center for Information and Study
on Clinical Research Participation, wrote a brochure
explaining the typical risks and benefits of clinical trialCorrespondence: swhitney@bcm.edu
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unless otherwise stated.participation. His goal was educational and the brochure
did not promote, or even mention, any specific study.
Yet an IRB objected to his discussion of how subjects
hope to benefit from trial participation and told him that
the word “hope” was coercive. The result was a frustra-
ted educator who inveighed against “IRB bureaucracy and
despotism” [3] and, no doubt, an IRB that felt the educator
does not understand ethical thought.
The Belmont Report, one of the foundational docu-
ments of research regulation, restricts “coercion” to the
use of “an overt threat of harm [4]”. This is consistent
with Webster’s, which specifies the use of “force or inti-
midation” and the Law Dictionary’s “compulsion; force;
duress [5,6]”. The distinguished ethicists Ruth Faden and
Thomas Beauchamp favor a slightly broader approach,
proposing that, in the context of informed consent, co-
ercion requires “a credible threat of unwanted and un-
avoidable harm so severe that the person is unable to
resist acting to avoid it [7]”. There is much more to beThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Barbara Evans have presented penetrating analyses of
the topic [8-10].
Popular IRB guides ignore these subtleties and mangle
the standard definitions. One handbook claims that “co-
ercion means that a person is to some degree forced, or
at least strongly pushed, to do something that is not
good for him or her to do. In discussions of research
regulation the term ‘undue influence’ is often used to
describe the concept of coercion [11]”. This manual
thus expands the narrow concept of coercion to include
persuasion.
A second handbook agrees: “Coercion can be subtle:
persuasion, argument, and personality can be used to
compel an individual to act in a certain way…. Coer-
cion—including all the subtle forms—has no place in
research [12]”. There is, of course, no such thing as sub-
tle coercion. A guide to IRB management and func-
tion claims that in recruitment for clinical trials, “the
possibilities for misinforming or disinforming poten-
tial subjects abound” and “the possibilities for inadver-
tent, unintentional coercion, or undue influence are
also high [13]”. Inadvertent or unintentional coercion
is oxymoronic.
With encouragement from these guides, IRBs reject
the standard meaning of the word and use “coercion” to
refer to any statement, however innocuous, that might
encourage trial participation. Some IRBs believe, for in-
stance, that it is coercive for a consent form to men-
tion that a study is funded by the National Institutes
of Health.
One example of the misuse of the concept of coercion
is in the acronyms of clinical trials. Investigators have
long realized that it is better to refer to a study as, for
instance, CAST instead of the Cardiac Arrhythmia Sup-
pression Trial; there are now thousands of acronymic
trials. The research ethics literature once ignored these
acronyms, then began to criticize them as potentially
coercive, and now presents that hypothesis as estab-
lished fact.
James Orlowski and James Christensen may have been
the first to argue that the acronyms of protocols, like
HELP or HOPE, might be coercive in themselves, writ-
ing in 2002 that acronyms “may be subtly playing on
the hopes or dreams of research subjects, a form of
coercion [14]”. By 2013, the “potentially coercive” na-
ture of acronyms had been transformed, without proof,
from speculation to fact in the Textbook of Pharmaceu-
tical Medicine, which states flatly that study acronyms
like CURE, HOPE and HELP “can entice a subject
to give consent [15]”. Optimism and coercion are thus
united.
IRBs are alert for coercion in the protocols they re-
view, and, when coercion is defined so liberally, theyreadily find it. Without realizing it, IRBs then substitute
the narrow meaning of the word for the broad one. Co-
ercion by force or threat of force would of course be un-
acceptable; this substitution of meanings gives IRBs
carte blanche to interfere with a wide range of investi-
gator actions they deem coercive. This is why Getz was
forbidden to mention hope in an educational brochure
describing clinical trials, a decision he found ridiculous.
But his opinion was irrelevant, since from the IRB deter-
mination there was no appeal.Vulnerability
The regulations instruct IRBs to provide “additional safe-
guards” when “some or all of the subjects are likely to
be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such as
children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled
persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged
persons ….” [16] Vulnerable groups are said to need ad-
ditional protections against coercion, however loosely
both terms are used. Vulnerability itself is only casually
defined and can be limitlessly expanded, for who is not
subject to influence?
The shell game here is in the shifting meaning of
the label “vulnerable.” A patient with AIDS is vulner-
able to tuberculosis; a prisoner is vulnerable to the
warden. These are different kinds of vulnerability. The
homeless are vulnerable to violence on the street but
not to advertisements that seductively suggest the gla-
mour of a Rolex on your wrist. IRBs go astray when they
determine that a group of subjects is vulnerable to one
harm and, based on that, pivot and protect that group
against an unrelated hazard that poses no threat to their
welfare.
So, for instance, one IRB’s community representative
resisted a proposal to study the homeless “because she
felt that the population was too easily exploited.” The
homeless might be vulnerable to offers of shelter and
food in exchange for participation in risky research; but
this scientist wanted merely to conduct interviews, a
harmless process that might aid the group [17].
When an IRB demands changes or rejects a proposal
because it considers the subjects to be vulnerable, the
investigator may disagree, believing that any vulnerabil-
ity is irrelevant to the proposed research; but no matter.
The IRB reserves the right to make its own, definitive,
judgment.Dignitary harm
Dignitary harm is not mentioned in the regulations gov-
erning IRBs; it came to prominence with the 2001 report
of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC).
Dignitary harms, announces NBAC, occur “when indi-
viduals are not treated as persons with their own values,
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not deserving of respect [18]”.
The nebulous concept of dignitary harm can lead to
pernicious regulatory guidance. Consider, for example,
a subject who is enrolled in a randomized controlled
trial without providing a fully informed consent, as
might happen in a study of an emergency condition
like cardiac arrest or a stroke. As Norman Fost notes,
in the absence of known effective therapy, innovative
care under the direction of the subject’s own doctor
(“essentially unreviewed, uncontrolled experimentation”)
would be an inferior alternative to participation in the
formal trial [19].
Morris and Nelson, discussing these options, concede
that although innovative care is “perhaps less safe” than
a controlled trial, enrolling subjects in the trial without
full informed consent may represent a dignitary harm.
The reason: if these subjects were fully informed, they
might be upset at being randomized, or at being as-
signed to a study arm later proven to be inferior, or
might believe that study participation was more harmful
(although it is not), or might even be dismayed to learn
of “the inadequacy of current medical knowledge [20]”.
Enrollment in a controlled trial that is safer is thus cast
in an ominous moral shadow because of irrational con-
cerns that the subject might or might not have.
Individual IRBs are free to follow analogous reasoning
as they review individual protocols, invoking the malle-
able concept of dignitary harm to justify intervention to
protect subjects from hypothetical or speculative risks.
Dignitary harm can be invoked whenever something seems
wrong to the board but no actual harm has occurred or
been threatened. Consider, for instance, large-scale data-
base research which cannot be done if consent is required.
NBAC considers research without consent to constitute a
dignitary harm—one that the subject never knows oc-
curred [18]. This “harm” may cloak a practical benefit, as
when scientists, by examining thousands of records, can
determine the subjects’ risk of cancer, but dignitary harm
may trump actual benefit [21].
Dignitary harm is an infinitely flexible concept, and
because it has no fixed meaning, an IRB can define it
any way it likes and the researcher cannot rebut it. We
might, instead, consider the possibility that participating
in research intended to improve the lives of one’s fellows
should be considered a dignitary benefit. But risk domi-
nates benefit in this regulatory system.
Conclusion
The baffled scientist
These variations on the shell game are a prime cause of
anger among investigators, who feel badly treated—like
any other shell game victim—but are unable to put their
finger on what went wrong.I am not accusing IRBs of hypocrisy. They appear sin-
cere in believing that these concepts are used in a spe-
cial sense in the context of research regulation, and that
investigators simply do not understand how research
ethics works. But malice is irrelevant. The shell game is
destructive whether the operator is a shark or a suit.
Competing interests
The author declares that there is no competing interests.
Author’s information
SW holds the William O’Donnell and Regina O’Donnell Chair in Family
Medicine in the Department of Family and Community Medicine at Baylor
College of Medicine. He served on the Stanford IRB in 1997–1998.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by funds from the William O’Donnell and
Regina O’Donnell Chair in Family Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine and
from the Center for Clinical Research and Evidence-Based Medicine at the
University of Texas Medical School at Houston. I would like to thank Carl E.
Schneider for pointing out the errors in the definition of “coercion” in the
IRB manuals and thank Patricia Naughton and three anonymous reviewers
for significant editorial suggestions.
Received: 23 May 2014 Accepted: 18 June 2014
Published: 14 August 2014
References
1. Schrag ZM: Ethical Imperialism: Institutional Review Boards and the Social
Sciences, 1965–2009. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2010.
2. Van den Hoonaard WC: The Seduction of Ethics: Transforming the Social
Sciences. Toronto; Buffalo [N.Y.]: University of Toronto Press; 2011.
3. Getz KA: Clinical trial insights frustration with IRB bureaucracy &
despotism. Appl Clin Trials 2011, 20:26–28.
4. National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research: The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, DHEW Publication No. (OS)
78–0012. 1978.
5. House R: Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. New York, NY:
Random House; 1998.
6. The Law Dictionary. 2nd edition. [http://thelawdictionary.org/coercion/]
7. Faden RR, Beauchamp TL, King NMP: A History and Theory of Informed
Consent. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986:261.
8. Baron J: Against Bioethics. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; 2006.
9. Wertheimer A: Coercion. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1987.
10. Evans BJ: Comments of Barbara J. Evans, Ph.D., J.D., LL.M. in Docket
HHS-OPHS-2011-0005: Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and
Ambiguity for Investigators. 2011. http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documentDetail;D=HHS-OPHS-2011-0005-0822.
11. Amdur RJ: Principles of the Belmont Report. In Institutional Review Board
Member Handbook, Volume 22. 3rd edition. Edited by Amdur RJ, Bankert EA.
Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett; 2011:19–27.
12. Mazur DJ: Evaluating the Science and Ethics of Research on Humans: A Guide
for IRB Members. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2007:41–42.
13. Whalen M, Khin-Maung-Gyi F: Recruitment of Research Subjects. In
Institutional Review Board: Management and Function. Edited by Bankert EA,
Amdur RJ. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett; 2006:147.
14. Orlowski JP, Christensen JA: The potentially coercive nature of some
clinical research trial acronyms. Chest 2002, 121:2023–2028.
15. Barrett J: Ethics of Human Experimentation. In Textbook of Pharmaceutical
Medicine, Volume 289. 7th edition. Edited by Griffin JP, Posner J, Barker G.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell; 2013:286–294.
16. 45 CFR 46.111(b).
17. Stark LJM: Morality in Science: How Research is Evaluated in the age of
Human Subjects Regulation. Princeton: PhD Dissertation; 2006:183.
18. National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Ethical and Policy Issues in Research
Involving Human Participants. Bethesda, MD: National Bioethics Advisory
Commission; 2001:72.
Whitney Journal of Translational Medicine 2014, 12:201 Page 4 of 4
http://www.translational-medicine.com/content/12/1/20119. Fost N: Waived consent for emergency research. Am J Law Med 1998,
24:163.
20. Morris MC, Nelson RM: Randomized, controlled trials as minimal risk: an
ethical analysis. Crit Care Med 2007, 35:940–944.
21. Hultman CM, Lindgren A, Hansson MG, Carlstedt-Duke J, Ritzen M, Persson I,
Kieler H: Ethical issues in cancer register follow-up of hormone treatment
in adolescence. Public Health Ethics 2009, 2:30–36.
doi:10.1186/1479-5876-12-201
Cite this article as: Whitney: The shell game: how institutional review
boards shuffle words. Journal of Translational Medicine 2014 12:201.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
